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CRIMINALIZING MONEY LAUNDERING AS A METHOD
AND MEANS OF CURBING CORRUPTION, ORGANIZED
CRIME, AND CAPITAL FLIGHT IN RUSSIA
Sam Chungt
Abstract: In the wake of the post-Soviet privatization in the Russian Federation,
corruption and organized crime have flourished, contributing to capital flight, economic
instability, and the collapse of Russia's financial system. Over the same period, Russian
legislators have worked to reform the legal system in order to facilitate their country's
transition to democracy and the rule of law. In 1997, legislative efforts led to the
enactment of a new criminal code that emphasizes the rights of the individual as opposed
to the power of the government. More recently, several draft bills targeting money
laundering activities and banking reform have been introduced in the Russian Parliament
in an effort to confront Russia's economic crisis. Government corruption and the close
connection between organized crime and the banking industry, however, have led to
fierce opposition to the enactment of such reform measures. Consequently, these
measures have been stalled. To confront the problems of crime and economic crisis,
Russia should enact a comprehensive anti-money laundering system that incorporates
provisions similar to those contained in the recent draft bills. In light of the success of
the U.S. anti-money laundering regime, the enactment of a similar system in Russia
would be a significant step towards confronting organized crime, government corruption,
and an ailing economy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Events in 1998 and 1999 involving Boris Berezovsky, a Russian
banking tycoon, media mogul, and former Commonwealth of Independent
States Executive Secretary, provide insight into Russia's post-privatization
problems with corruption, money laundering, and capital flight. In late
1998, former FBI and CIA administrator William Webster linked
Berezovsky to money laundering activities when he indicated that
Berezovsky had diverted privatized funds to offshore accounts.
In early 1999, in part because of his connections with high-ranking
members of the government (including President Boris Yeltsin), Berezovsky
became the focus of an investigation into Kremlin corruption led by Russian
t The author would like to thank Jim Lord for the unique help he provided with this research
project. The author would also like to give his deepest gratitude to his mother, father, and sister Moon for a
lifetime of love and support.
I The Duma Needs Berezovsky's Millions, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, Nov. 13, 1998, available in
1998 WL 17741694. While Berezovsky declared a salary of $43,000 in 1997, the value of his assets has
been estimated at $3 billion. Russia, a Superpower Falls Apart, EUROMONEY, Sept. 10, 1998, available in
1998 WL 10017968.
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procurator 2 Yuri Skuratov.3 In April, Skuratov issued an arrest warrant for
Berezovsky. The warrant accused Berezovsky of using a Swiss-based
company to divert hundreds of millions of dollars from the Russian Aeroflot
Corporation.4 The Kremlin responded to Skuratov's investigation by
releasing a video allegedly showing the prosecutor engaged in illicit conduct
with two prostitutes. Yeltsin used this video to declare Skuratov unfit to
perform his official duties.6 Although Yeltsin was successful in obtaining
Skuratov's suspension, attempts to remove the prosecutor were twice
blocked by the Russian Federation Council.7 Commentators in Russia have
suggested that Yeltsin's actions were intended to prevent the exposure of
high-level crime and corruption.
8
The controversy involving Berezovsky is typical of a post-Soviet
Russia that is plagued by the influence and effects of political corruption and
organized crime. For the past decade, Russian lawmakers have struggled to
control the pervasive problems of crime, corruption, and economic
instability by overhauling Russia's criminal laws. As part of this effort, the
Russian Federation enacted a new criminal code that criminalized many
activities such as money laundering.9 More recently, Russian legislators
have attempted to address capital flight, corruption, and crime by proposing
the enactment of aggressive anti-money laundering legislation. Political
constituents connected to Russia's banking industry have consistently
blocked the passage of such legislation.
This Comment discusses and evaluates the Russian Federation's
efforts to combat corruption, crime, and capital flight and compares Russia's
recently proposed money laundering legislation with the U.S. anti-money
laundering regime. Part II provides a description of the post-Soviet
economy and the rise of corruption and organized crime in Russia. Part III
describes current efforts by Russian legislators to curb money laundering
activities and compares the pending Russian legislation to similar legislation
2 A Russian procurator is similar in function to a prosecutor. In addition to carrying out
prosecutorial functions, however, Russian procurators carry out policing and adjudicative functions such as
granting warrants for searches, seizures, and arrests. STEPHEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRIMINAL:
RUSSIA'S NEW MAFIYA 280-81 (1995). Unless otherwise stated, the term "prosecutor" will hereinafter be
used in reference to a Russian "procurator."
3 Yeltsin Lashes out at Prosecutor, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 10, 1999, available in 1999 WL 6806841.
4 Owen Matthews, Warrant out for Arrest of Berezovsky. After Raids, SCOTSMAN, Apr. 7, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 15108704.
5 Sharon LaFraniere, Yeltsin Loses Second Bid to Oust Top Prosecutor, Legislators Say Kremlin




9 See infra notes 75-82.
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in the United States. Part IV examines barriers to effective money
laundering prosecution in the Russian Federation and argues that the
proposed laws, if passed, will have a limited effect in the short-term given
the limitations of the post-Soviet legal system. Changes in Russian society
and the Russian legal system, such as the development of an independent
judiciary, the establishment of systems for political accountability, and the
reform of Russia's banking system, must be effectuated if the proposed laws
are to have a significant effect. Part V offers recommendations for the
Russian anti-money laundering regime.
The need for changes in Russian society and its legal system should
not delay the immediate enactment of a comprehensive anti-money
laundering regime that more effectively deals with Russia's problems of
organized crime and financial collapse. To achieve this goal, international
pressure in the form of conditional economic relief is necessary to counter
efforts to thwart reform. Only through the implementation of an anti-money
laundering system will Russia be able to trace the illicit activities of the
Mafiyal ° and stem the flow of capital out of Russia. To achieve the goals of
economic and legal reform, organizations and nations interested in Russia's
transition to democracy must exert pressure on Russian lawmakers to enact
laws that will prevent money laundering.
II. ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA
Following the Soviet Communist Party's fall from power and the
subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia experienced a
drastic increase in crime. The Office of the Russian Procurator reported a
33% rise in criminal activity from 1991 to 1992.11 Murder and aggravated
assault accounted for more than one-half of the 2.7 million crimes
recorded.' 2 In 1993, the murder rate jumped 27%, and crimes committed
with firearms climbed by 250%. 13 More recently, Procurator Yury Skuratov
reported a 10% increase in severe crimes and a 15% increase in economic
crimes for 1998.14 In that same year, there were over 30,000 premeditated
murders and murder attempts and 599 contract killings in Russia.15
10 The terms "Mafiya" and "Mafia" are both commonly used to refer to Russian organized crime
groups. HANDELMAN, supra note 2, at 381-82. This paper will use "Mafiya."
" Id. at 3.
12 Id.
13 Id.
" Russia's 1998 Crime Rate Rose by 7.7Percent, J. COM., Jan. 13, 1999, available in 1999 WL 6370070.
15 6th Arrest Made in Kholodov Killing, MOScow TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999, available in 1999 WL 6805518.
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A. Privatization and the Criminalization of Business in Russia
With perestroika,16 demokratiya,17 and the massive privatization of
post-Soviet Russia, organized crime groups that had thrived underground
since the 1960s emerged from the shadows.18 The Mafiya was one of the
main beneficiaries of the new Russia. 19 "The Mafiosi became investors, and
black and gray money flowed into the newly created 'stock exchanges, joint
ventures, cooperatives, banks, and joint stock companies that were otherwise
celebrated as harbingers of economic reform."'
20
By 1992, the Mafiya had invested in and taken control of an estimated
eighty percent of small and large businesses in Moscow. 2I These businesses
often provide a legitimate front for illicit Mafiya activities such as extortion,
prostitution, gambling, drug trafficking, contract killings, auto theft, and the
smuggling of consumer goods, natural resources, nuclear weapons, and
human beings.22 In early 1998, Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs
estimated that more than 40,000 domestic businesses (1500 of which were
state-owned enterprises), 4000 joint-stock companies, 700 wholesale and
retail companies, and 550 banks were criminally influenced or controlled.23
Perhaps more disturbing and indicative of the complexities facing
Russia's efforts to control crime is the unique composition of criminal
elements in post-Soviet Russia. Under the concept of illegality inherited
from the Soviet era, criminal activity is construed as any conduct that
challenges state authority.24  Under the Soviet justice system, the
Communist Party, as the sole ruling authority, not only suppressed organized
crime, but itself held a monopoly over theft, embezzlement, and
corruption. 25  In the post-Soviet era, many former bureaucrats of the
6 Perestroika refers to the "restructuring" campaign launched by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986.
HANDELMAN, supra note 2, at 4.
" Demokratiya literally means "democratization." Id. at 3.
18 Shoshanah V. Asnis, Controlling the Russian Mafia: Russian Legal Confusion and U.S.
Jurisdictional Power-Play, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 299, 303 (1996).
]9 Id.
20 Id. (quoting Stephen Handelman, The Russian "Mafiya, " FOR. AFF., Mar.-Apr., 1994, at 87, 87).
21 Id.
22 Louise Shelley, Post-Soviet Organized Crime and the Rule of Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 827,
829 (1995).
23 How the U.S. State Department Views Money Laundering in Select Countries, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Apr. 1998, at 11.
24 HANDELMAN, supra note 2, at 275.
25 Mike Cormaney, RICO in Russia: Effective Control of Organized Crime or Another Empty
Promise?, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261, 269 (1997).
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Communist Party, including those of the nomenklatura26 party elite, have
capitalized on their unique relationship with state institutions and regulatory
bodies to participate in organized crime and "to [use] the institutions of state
power to protect their political and economic interests." 27 Perestroika and
the rapid privatization of post-Soviet Russia has acted as a vehicle for
former bureaucrats and officials of the Communist Party to channel state
funds into banks, corporations, real estate development projects, and other
"legitimate" areas in the private sector.
28
B. Corruption in the Russian Federation
Corruption continues to pervade Russia's governing and policing
bodies. President Boris Yeltsin's announcement in 1993 of a "full head-on
assault on crime, bribery, and corruption" at a government and law
enforcement conference in Moscow indicated the extent of Russia's
problems with government corruption.29 For example, according to then-
acting procurator Aleksei Ilyushenko, more than 46,000 officials from all
levels of government in Russia were tried on charges related to corruption
and abuse of office in 1993.30 In 1996, Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov
reported that more than 2000 Russian policemen had been charged with
crimes in that year.3 1 By October of 1996, 960 officers in Moscow alone
32had been dismissed for misconduct. In 1998, Interior Minister Sergei
Stepashin stated that 5500 officials were under investigation for taking
bribes.33
It is generally believed that the influence of organized crime extends
to Russia's parliament, which includes the State Duma ("Duma") and the
26 Nomenklatura refers to the "elite membership of the Soviet governing system, so called because
their names appeared on the list of names of the most loyal Party officials eligible for senior posts at home
and abroad." HANDELMAN, supra note 2, at 382.
27 Shelley, supra note 22, at 828-30.
28 See HANDELMAN, supra note 2, at 152-60.
[W]hat we see is a different kind of criminal who has one foot in the old black market world, the
old criminal world, and another foot in the official world, the world of politics and the old
structure of the Party. And this new type of criminal, this new type of thief, is what people are
now regarding as the mafia.
Cormaney, supra note 25, at 270-71 (quoting COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA 13 (1994) [remarks by Stephen Handelman]).
29 HANDELMAN, supra note 2, at 285-95.
30 Id. at 285.
3' Review and Outlook: Murder in Moscow, WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 8, 1996, at 6.
32 id.
33 News, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5605447.
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Federation Council. 34  One Duma committee report estimated that twenty-
five to thirty percent of the political candidates in the December 1995
elections "represent[ed] influence of the criminal structures either openly or
covertly."
35
C. Money Laundering in Russia
The laundering of government and privatized funds in offshore areas
by organized crime groups and the former Soviet ruling elite permits these
groups to evade both criminal and tax liability under Russian law.36 The
purpose of this laundering is to fund illicit activities in other countries, 37 to
generate income in a more favorable environment,38 or simply to hide capital
obtained unlawfully. 39 Deputies of the Duma have referred to such offshore
zones as "black holes where state funds disappear." 40 The creation of such
"black holes" has both contributed to and prolonged financial instability in
the Russian economy.
In the absence of an effective anti-money laundering system,
laundering of illegally derived income within and outside of Russia has been
3 Cormaney, supra note 25, at 271. Russia's parliament is comprised of a lower house (the State
Duma) and an upper house (the Federation Council).
" Id. at271.
36 The Duma Needs Berezovsky's Millions, supra note 1.
3' FBI Director Louis Freeh estimates that organized crime groups in Russia have expanded their
activities to more than 50 countries. Ross Mackenzie, For Beleaguered Russia, Some Proposals for
Genuine Reconstruction, RICHMOND-TIMES DISP., Oct. 15, 1998, at A 15.
38 For example, many companies in the Russian fishing industry have established U.S. subsidiaries
to manage foreign bank accounts in locales such as England or Cyprus. E-mail correspondence from Vlad
Kaczynski, Russian Marine Affairs Specialist, University of Washington, to Sam Chung, Comment Author,
Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 1 (Jan. 22, 1999) (on file with the author). The proceeds from exports
of seafood are diverted through the U.S. subsidiaries of such companies in order to avoid legal
requirements in Russia. Id. Many of these corporations are located in the Pacific Northwest region of the
United States. One such company, along with its Russian parent, was the subject of a Justice Department
investigation in which the author participated as a clerk at the Office of the United States Attorney. In that
case, the government was investigating the head of a Russian fishing corporation (who resided in the
Seattle area) on charges of wire and money fraud, tax evasion, and money laundering. The government
alleged that the Russian corporation had diverted illicitly generated income through its Washington
subsidiary and into a bank account in Cyprus.
39 The scandal involving Boris Berezovsky's alleged offshore assets serves to reinforce the common
suspicion that former members of the Soviet ruling elite have used the privatization of Russia to divert
questionable funds elsewhere. This scandal erupted when William Webster, a former CIA and FBI
administrator, told a Duma delegation visiting the United States that Berezovsky once spent $72 million on
real estate in Antigua. The Duma Needs Berezovsky's Millions, supra note 1. While Berezovsky declared
a salary of $43,000 in 1997, the value of his assets has been estimated to be $3 billion. Russia, a
SuperfoOwer Falls Apart, supra note 1.
The Duma Needs Berezovsky's Millions, supra note 1.
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accomplished with relative ease. 4 1  Russia's inability to detect and to
prosecute money laundering activities has permitted former members of the
Soviet governmental apparatus to legitimize their embezzled funds.42  It has
also allowed organized crime groups to thrive in an environment in which
large-scale financial transactions remain unmonitored.43  Following the
decentralization of Russia's financial system in the post-Soviet era, and as a
result of weak banking regulations, criminal groups with significant amounts
of capital were able to take control of Russia's banks and even to create their
own banks. 44
D. Global Interests in the Russian Crisis
The reform of Russia's financial, political, and legal systems holds
significance both for the United States and for the development of a
democratic world order governed by the rule of law.45  Russia's current
inability to control its financial system and the prevalence of money
laundering activities within that system have had repercussions of a global
nature, including political and economic instability in Eurasia and the
injection of criminal proceeds into foreign markets.46
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates that nearly half of
Russia's banks are now controlled by organized crime groups that are using
the banks to launder illegally obtained revenues.47 Such criminal groups
4' Bill Gertz, Mobsters Run Banks in Russia, Money Laundering Common, FBI Says, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1998, at Al.
42 See Jamestown Foundation, Mixed Prospects for Russian Tax Crackdown, MONITOR, (June 11,
1998) <http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view /mon/004/112_00l.htm> (discussing a proposed law which
would require the reporting of large scale transactions).
43 id.
44 Until recently, any Russian with $100,000 could open a banking institution. HANDELMAN, supra
note 2, at 197. The required starting capital was later raised to about $1.2 million, but by then drug profits
provided enough funds to get around this obstacle. Id.
45 Lawrence Summers, U.S. Relations with Russia and Economic Crisis, Testimony Before the
House International Committee (Sept. 17 1998), available in WESTLAW, CONGTMY file. Summers
notes:
A prolonged crisis [in Russia] would call into question the spread of open market policies in
other emerging nations . . . [and] would raise important concerns for our broader national
security, given Russia's pivotal and continuing role with respect to nuclear security, the battle




47 Gertz, supra note 41. Further evidence of organized crime's hold on the Russian banking system
can be found in the "significant lack of bank robberies among the crime statistics and the high rate of
murder of bank officials in Russia." Cormaney, supra note 25, at 275.
SEPT. 1999
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
"have played the dominant role in channeling much of the $200 billion in
capital flight from the Russian Federation in the last decade., 48  The
inadequate regulation of the Russian banking industry49 and the influence of
organized crime on that sector led the U.S. State Department's Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters to conclude in 1994 that Russia is a "dream
location" for the money laundering post-Cold War global criminal. Capital
flight occurring in the absence of anti-money laundering laws contributed to
the collapse of Russia's financial system in the early 1990s and continues to
afflict the post-Soviet economy.
5 1
The pervasiveness of organized crime in Russia and the instability of
Russia's financial system have created a lack of investment confidence in
Russian markets. In 1997, Russia received a mere $4.5 billion in foreign
direct investment, which equals roughly one percent of its gross domestic
product. It has received a total of only $10 billion in foreign investment
since 1991. 53  Foreign investors choosing to enter Russian markets are
confronted with significant financial and physical risks. Deposits that are
placed in Russian banks are subject to the risk of irrevocable loss due to the
banking sector's instability. 54 Moreover, the costs of extortion at the hands
of organized crime are high for those businesses that choose to locate in
Russia.
The Clinton administration has emphasized the importance of
reforming Russia's economic and legal institutions for U.S. national security
4' Gertz, supra note 41.
0 Another problem caused by the privatization of the Russian economy was that the few banking
regulatory agencies in Russia were overwhelmed by the proliferation of private banks during the early
1990s. Abraham Abramovsky, Prosecuting the "Russian Mafia ": Recent Russian Legislation and
Increased Bilateral Cooperation May Provide the Means, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 205 (1996).
so HANDELMAN, supra note 2, at 197. The Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, in a report
published in 1994, concluded that Russia fulfilled 17 of the 22 conditions on a hypothetical "money
launderer's shopping list." Id. These "ideal" conditions include, among others, the lack of monitoring of
currency movements inside and outside of the country, easy evasion of exchange controls, weak banking
regulations, no requirement for reporting suspicious transactions, and a significant trade in precious gems.
Id.
51 Marie-Josee Kravis, National Viewpoint: Wishful Thinking Alone Won't Help Russia's Economy,
FIN. POST, Aug. 19, 1998, at 11.
52 Russia, a Superpower Falls Apart, supra note 1. In comparison, for the year 1997, Brazil received
nearly $18 billion, and China received more than $45 billion. Id.
53 Id.
' John Helmer, Russian Banks Send Depositors to the Wall, Bus. REV. WKLY., Oct. 19, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 11773222 (describing the risk of lost deposits caused by defaulting Russian banks).
55 HANDELMAN, supra note 2, at 157-60. Ironically, one reason that is often given by businessmen
in Russia who fail to report income to the authorities is that they fear that such financial information will
end up in the hands of the Mafiya, the members of which will then pay them a visit seeking "protection
money." Id.
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and economic interests both at home and abroad.5 6 In response to political
and economic crisis in Russia, the U.S., the International Monetary Fund
("IMF"), and the World Bank instituted several relief programs there,
including a two-year, $22.6 billion package to provide the Russian
Federation with "financial breathing space to press on with reform." 57
Such relief may, as a result of non-competitive connections between
business and government, 58 be filling the pockets of the post-Soviet elite
and may ultimately be diverted to offshore accounts. 59 Because the capital
flight associated with the activities of organized crime groups and the
post-Soviet ruling elite undermines Russia's reform efforts by diverting
badly needed capital away from government programs, the United States
has urged the Russian Federation to curb money laundering activities by
passing anti-money laundering legislation.6°
III. MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Legislation in the United States has proven to be an effective means
of curbing money laundering and tracing the illicit activities of organized
crime groups in the United States.6' Such laws have not yet been passed in
Russia because Russia's well-developed network of corruption and
organized crime has frustrated efforts to reform the legal system there.62
However, recent legal reforms in Russia, including proposals for the
63enactment of a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime, give hope
to those interested in reforming the system.
56 Summers, supra note 45.
" Id. The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") instituted this relief package in July 1997. Id.58 "Non-competitive connections" refer to a corrupt government official's ability to offer inside
breaks to businesses in which the official has a vested interest.
59 Summers, supra note 45. According to Venyamin Sokolov, head of Russia's Chamber of
Accounts, of the $2.3 billion allocated to Moscow for the reconstruction of Chechnya, "just over half was
carelessly accounted for and the rest disappeared." Russia, a Superpower Falls Apart, supra note I. In
addition, "[slome $2 billion [in relief money] disappeared without explanation from the central bank's hard
currency reserve accounts in 1995." Id. Of the $500 million allocated by the World Bank to Russia's
deficient mining industry, "[a]t least $240 million has disappeared." Id.
60 Summers, supra note 45.
61 1996-1997 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING ANN. REP. 14 (1997) [hereinafter
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING].62 See infra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
63 See infra Part III.B-D.
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A. The Rationale of Money Laundering Prosecution: A Look at the U.S.
Model
The development of comprehensive anti-money laundering
legislation in the United States was a response to the growing need to
control narcotics trafficking. 64  United States legislation in this area
brought about several substantive changes in the law that were designed to
combat money laundering activities, including the criminalization of the
act of money laundering and the structuring of transactions to avoid
reporting requirements; the creation of a requirement that financial
institutions play an active role in reporting suspicious transactions; the
enactment of strict criminal and/or civil penalties for both the money
launderer and the non-compliant financial institution; and the enactment of
provisions for the forfeiture of property in appropriate circumstances.
65
The premise behind the U.S. prosecution of money laundering is
that if the government traces a criminal's proceeds from illegal activities,
it will discourage criminals from engaging in such activities by cutting off
the criminal's lifeblood capital.66 During the act of laundering money, the
criminal is most vulnerable to detection at the point of "placement," which
is the initial stage at which the money launderer attempts to (1) convert the
cash for purposes of exchange to another medium that is more convenient
or less suspicious, such as property, cashier's checks, or money orders,67
or (2) deposit the funds into a financial institution account for subsequent
68disbursement. Because placement is one of the most difficult steps for
64 Kavita Natarajan, Combatting India's Heroin Trade Through Anti-Money Laundering Legislation,
21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2013, 2043 (1998).
65 Anti-money laundering laws in the United States include the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 ("BSA"),
31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-42 (1995); the Money Laundering Control Act-of 1986 ("MLCA"), Subtitle H of Title I
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-67, 100 Stat. 3207-39 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324-26); the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 18, 22,
and 31 U.S.C.); and the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (1999).
6 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED
IMPROVEMENTS FOR REPORTING SusPicious TRANSACTIONS ARE PLANNED, REPORT TO THE RANKING
MINORITY MEMBER, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS 10 (1995) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. In the MLCA's legislative history, Senator Joseph Biden
notes, "[m]oney laundering is a crucial financial underpinning of organized crime and narcotics trafficking.
Without money laundering, drug traffickers would literally drown in cash. Drug traffickers need money
laundering to conceal the billions of dollars in cash generated annually in drug sales and to convert [the]
cash into manageable form." S. REP. No. 99-433, at 4 (1986).67 GAO REPORT, supra note 66.
68 Id. This description is a generalization of several discrete forms of placement, which include: (1)
physical disposal of bulk cash proceeds (by deposit or purchase of financial instruments); (2) the
structuring of cash transactions to avoid reporting requirements; (3) bank complicity (when bank personnel
are corrupted, intimidated, or controlled); (4) misuse of exemptions (exemptions may be given to a business
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the money launderer to accomplish, the inclusion of financial institutions
in the investigation of money laundering activities has had a significant
positive impact on the detection of organized crime activities in the United
States.69
In order to detect the placement of criminal proceeds into legitimate
financial channels, U.S. Treasury Department regulations promulgated
under the authority of the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA") require
financial institutions to maintain exhaustive records and to report various
domestic financial transactions meeting the requisite $10,000 threshold.70
In addition, these institutions must report both the transport of monetary
instruments worth more than $10,000 into or out of the United States71 and
transactions between a U.S. citizen and a foreign financial institution
72involving $10,000 or more.
Russia could use a comprehensive anti-money laundering system
like the one in effect in the United States to prosecute organized crime and
control the financial collapse caused by capital flight. Such a system
should require the reporting of suspicious financial transactions at the
"placement" stage in order to cutoff or deter money laundering activities.
Legislators in Moscow such as Victor Ilyukhin 73 are working to enact laws
similar to those in the United States.
74
well-known to a financial institution when the business has a known reason to engage in otherwise
suspicious financial transactions); (5) commingling of licit and illicit funds in established front companies;
(6) asset purchases in cash (autos, aircraft, boats, precious stones, and metals, etc.); and (7) cross-border
currency smuggling. Emesto U. Savona & Michael A. De Feo, International Money Laundering Trends
and Prevention/Control Policies, in RESPONDING TO MONEY LAUNDERING: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
9, 23-24 (Emesto U. Savona ed., 1997).
69 GAO Report, supra note 66. Particularly in narcotics trafficking, the criminal is often faced with
massive amounts of cash which must either be concealed or converted into legitimate income. As an
example, $1 billion in $100 bills weighs over 11 tons. Ronald K. Noble& Court E. Golumbic, A New Anti-
Crime Framework for the World: Merging the Objective and Subjective Models for Fighting Money
Laundering, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 79, 85 n.5 (1998).
70 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1995)
71 Id.
72 Id. See generally Raymond Banoun, Money Laundering and Currency Reporting Laws and Their
Applicability to Gaming Businesses, 1998 A.B.A. CENTER CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., available in
WESTLAW, N98GENB ABALGLED B-1.
73 Viktor llyukhin is the current head of the Duma's security committee. Jamestown Foundation,
Duma Veers Far to Government's Left, MONITOR, (Oct. 22, 1998) <http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/
mon/004/195 001.htm>.
" See infra notes 90-137 and accompanying text.
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B. Legal Reform and the New Criminal Code
By any account, Russia's new Criminal Code75 ("CCRF") is a great
improvement over its predecessor, the Code of the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic, a relic of the 1960s which carried all of the ideological
baggage of the Soviet regime.76 The CCRF, enacted on January 1, 1997,
was a product of both the need to address the changing social, political, and
economic conditions of contemporary Russian society and the need to
confront the drastic increase in post-Soviet crime.77  The CCRF
complements previous legal reforms, including the enactment in 1989 of a
statute criminalizing disrespect for the judicial system and the enactment of
the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993.78 A new criminal
procedure code is still pending before the Russian Parliament and is
expected to be adopted after 1999.
79
75 Ugolovnyi Kodeks Rossiskoi Federatsii [The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation] (adopted
June 13, 1996) [hereinafter CCRF] No. 63-FZ, translated in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rflaw File. While a
thorough examination of the CCRF's provisions, especially those dealing with economic crimes, is
warranted, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment. This discussion will focus on the
Russian Federation's efforts to draft effective legislation to address the problems of money laundering and
associated offenses. Under the CCRF, economic crimes include the following: interference with lawful
entrepreneurial activity; registration of unlawful real estate agreements; illegal entrepreneurial activity;
fraudulent entrepreneurial activity; illegal procurement of credit; monopolization and unfair competition;
use of coercion in negotiating an agreement; unlawful use of trademarks or the state hallmark; violation of
manufacturing rules; advertising in a knowingly false manner; illegal acquisition and dissemination of
information constituting commercial and banking secrets; bribery of participants and organizers of
professional sports and commercial events; securities issuance violations; manufacture and distribution of
fraudulent credit or debit cards and other negotiable instruments; illegal export of technology, scientific
information, and services used in the production of weapons of mass destruction and other military
equipment; unlawful trade in precious metals, gems, or pearls; flight of foreign currency; evasion of
customs payments; illegal bankruptcy activities; deliberate or false bankruptcy; income tax evasion;
corporate tax evasion; and consumer fraud. Id.
76 Among the obsolete provisions the new Criminal Code abolishes are those related to punishment
for failure to report the activities of others to police, participation in anti-Soviet organizations, wrecking
activities and the sale and purchase of fur-bearing animals, and participation in entrepreneurial activities.
Congratulations on the New Code!, RUSSIAN PRESS DIG., Jan. 6, 1997, available in WESTLAW, RUSSPD
Database.
77 See Anatolyi V. Naumov, The New Russian Criminal Code as a Reflection of Ongoing Reforms, 8
CRIM. L.F. 191, 191 (1997).
" Id. at 194-96.
79 Stanlislaw Pomorski, Reflections on the First Criminal Code of Post-Communist Russia, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 375, 376 (1998). Much like the outdated criminal code that preceded the CCRF, Russia's Code
of Criminal Procedure has been subject to the criticism that its provisions have little practical force in light
of the recent structural changes in Russian society. Id. Partially because the enactment of the new Code of
Criminal Procedure is expected to both clarify and give legal force to police and prosecutorial practices,
lobbying interests in Moscow have effectively stalled its enactment. Telephone Interview with Scott
Boylan, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training ("OPDAT"), Department of Justice,
Criminal Division (Jan. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Boylan].
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C. Money Laundering: Article 174 of the CCRF
Article 174 of the CCRF, entitled Legalization of Money (Money-
Laundering) or of Any Other Assets Acquired Illegally,80 is the current
CCRF money laundering provision. Article 174 contains only rudimentary
provisions for the criminalization of money laundering activities. It states:
1. The completion of financial transactions and other deals with
money or any other assets acquired in an obviously illegal way,
and also the use of said money for business or any other
economic activity, shall be punishable by fine in the amount of
500 to 700 minimum wages81 income of the convicted person
for a period of five to seven months, or by deprivation of
liberty for a term of up to four years with the fine the amount
of 100 minimum wages or salaries or in the amount of the
wage or salary, or any other income of the convicted person for
a period of one month or without such fine.
2. The same deed committed:
a) by a group of persons in a preliminary conspiracy;
b) repeatedly; or
c) by a person using his official position;
shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty [for] eight years
with confiscation of property or without such confiscation.
3. The acts, envisaged by the first or second part of this Article
and committed by an organized group or on a large scale, shall
be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of seven to
ten years with confiscation of property or without such
confiscation.82
'0 CCRF, supra note 75, art. 174.
81 As of January 1999, one minimum wage was equivalent to 87 rubles per month, and 23 rubles
were roughly equivalent to one dollar. Boylan, supra note 79.
82 CCRF, supra note 75, art. 174. Article 174 is little more than a skeletal provision purporting to
criminalize money laundering activities. This is so in part because the provisions contained in the CCRF
are merely a first step in the legal reform process. Id. Stated in another way, "[the CCRF's] primary
importance is as a theoretical normative statement... the new code announces the principles under which
Russians one day hope to live." Suzanne Possehl, Russia Is Fighting Thugs and Con Artists with New
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Unlike the U.S. anti-money laundering legislation,83 Article 174 does
not specify what constitutes a "financial transaction" or "other deals with
money." Moreover, Article 174 does not specify what types of conduct are
covered by the phrase "obviously illegal way." In order to cover the
expansive channels a criminal may use to launder illegal funds, the U.S.
anti-money laundering laws provide broad definitions for both a "financial
institution, 84 (which is required to report financial transactions under U.S.
law) and a "financial transaction. 85 Article 174's vague provisions do not
necessarily cover the wide range of money laundering activities possible.
Sections 2 and 3 of Article 6 appear strong because they provide for
increased penalties and property forfeitures for group activity, repeat
conduct, or the abuse of an official position.86 The merits of Article 6
however, fail to compensate for its lack of specificity. This deficiency is of
great consequence given the Russian Federation's civil law tradition.87
Unlike in the common law system of the United States, stare decisis, or
adherence to decided cases, is not a principle of Russian jurisprudence and
judicial decisions have limited precedential weight.88  Consequently,
Laws. but Is That Enough?, 82 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 72, 73 (1996) (quoting Peter H. Solomon Jr.)
(internal quotations omitted).
83 See supra notes 64-72.
'4 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2); 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(i). The Treasury Department has interpreted
"financial institution" broadly to include banks (including foreign banks in the United States), federally
regulated securities brokers, currency exchange houses, investment banking companies, telegraph
companies, check cashing businesses, funds transmitters, casinos, insurance companies, operators of credit
card systems, pawnbrokers, dealers in precious stones or metals, travel agencies, real estate brokers, the
United States Postal Service in the sale of money orders, and automobile dealerships. Id.
s5 The legislative history of the MLCA notes:
Section 1956(c)(4) defines the term "financial transaction" very broadly [to include not only
transactions involving financial institutions, but] all forms of commercial activity. The only
requirement is that the transaction must "affect interstate or foreign commerce" or be conducted
through or by a financial institution which is engaged in or the activities of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce "in any way or degree.
S. REP. No. 99-433, at 13. "Transaction" thus includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer,
delivery, or other broad disposition of property between private parties. With respect to a financial
institution, it includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan,
extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument,
or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means
effected. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MONEY LAUNDERING: FEDERAL PROSECUTION
MANUAL R5 (1994) [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL].
:6 CCRF, supra note 75, art. 174.
' Scott P. Boylan, The Status of Judicial Reform in Russia, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1327, 1341-42
(1998).
88 Id. In addition, Russia does not have a system for reporting judicial decisions. Id. See also ALAN
WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 168-78 (1981), reprinted in THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 938-43 (John H. Merryman et al. eds., 1994) (describing the
"derivative" legal nature ofjudicial decisions in civil law traditions).
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Russia's criminal and civil codes must be comprehensive in breadth and
precise in definition in order to provide guidance and authority to law
enforcement bodies.8 9
D. Pending Legislation
Following the enactment of the CCRF, the Russian Federation
attempted to cure Article 174's inadequate enforcement mechanisms and
lack of comprehensiveness by introducing several noteworthy draft laws for
debate. These include draft amendments to the CCRF, 9° a draft law on
money laundering prosecution ("Money Laundering Draft"),9' and a draft
law on expenditure verification requirements to be used to track large
92property acquisitions.
1. Draft Law on Money Laundering Prosecution
a. Purpose and scope
The stated purpose of the Money Laundering Draft is to "protect [the]
rights and lawful interests of citizens, society, and the government . . . [and]
to establish a system of measures to counteract legalization of [criminal]
proceeds through illegal means. 93  This bill applies to Russian citizens,
foreign nationals, permanent aliens, and legal entities with an interest in the
Russian Federation. 94  The Money Laundering Draft provides a broad
definition of financial organizations as "organizations conducting
89 WATSON, supra note 88.
90 On Introduction of Amendments and Additions into Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation
Related to the Passage of the Federal Law "On Combating Legalization (Laundering) of illegal Proceeds "
[hereinafter CCRF Draft], in MATERIALS FOR AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS OF PROSECUTORIAL TRAINING
WORKSHOP ON ORGANIZED CRIME ISSUES IN VLADIVOSTOK, RUSSIA sec. 1 (1998) (on file with author)
[hereinafter PROSECUTORIAL MATERIALS].
9' Draft Russian Federal Law "On Combating Legalization (Laundering) of Illegal Proceeds"
[hereinafter Money Laundering Draft], in PROSECUTORIAL MATERIALS, supra note 90, at sec. 4.
92 Draft Russian Federal Law "On State Measures to Verify that Large Expenditures for Consumer
Goods Are Consistent with the Income Actually Obtained by Natural Persons" [hereinafter Verification
Draft], in PROSECUTORIAL MATERIALS, supra note 90, at sec. 5.
93 Money Laundering Draft, supra note 91, art. 1(2).
9" Id. art. 2(1)-(2). The bill also applies to (1) citizens of the Russian Federation and permanent
aliens who conduct unlawful activities under Russian laws against other nations, provided that such
violations are also considered unlawful in the country where conducted and that such persons have not
already been held liable in the foreign nation, and (2) foreign nationals and permanent or temporary aliens
who conduct unlawful activities outside of the Russian Federation that are directed against the interests of
the Russian Federation or its citizens, if such persons have not already been held liable for such activities in
the foreign nation. Id.
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transactions with monetary resources or other property" ("Financial
Organization"),95 much like the U.S. Treasury Department's definition of a
"financial institution."
96
Under the Money Laundering Draft, the proposed definition of
"illegal proceeds" is "possessions or other subject matter of civil law
acquired by illegal means-things, money, securities and other property,
including rights to property, that are acquired as a result of a crime or
another violation of the law." 97  This provision would be the triggering
mechanism for the activity to constitute money laundering, and is similar in
function to the specified unlawful activities ("SUA") provisions of the U.S.
Money Laundering Control Act ("MLCA").98  Unlike the SUA provisions,
however, the phrase "crime or another violation of the law" is vague and has
been the subject of great criticism in Russian lobbying circles.99
The Money Laundering Draft does not have a provision similar to
Section 1957 of the MLCA, which requires that an individual or entity under
investigation for money laundering know that the funds are derived from
some kind of criminal activity.100 Instead, a money laundering violation is
defined as the "intentional imparting [of] a legal appearance to the usage,
possession, or control of items, monetary resources, securities, or other
95 This definition includes credit institutions, commodity and currency exchanges, investment funds,
insurance organizations and insurance associations, trust companies, dealerships and brokerages, postal
services, technical inventory offices, casinos and other gambling enterprises, bookmaking offices, backers
or organizers of lotteries, pawnshops, discount offices, notary offices, and other organizations performing
receipt, alienation, payment, transfer, transport, exchange, or storage of monetary resources and other
property, as well as organizations performing notary certification or governmental registration of
transactions of citizens and legal entities. Id. art. 3(5).
96 See discussion supra note 84.
97 Money Laundering Draft, supra note 91, art. 3(1).
98 Under nearly all provisions of the MLCA, the prosecution is required to show that the suspect
financial transaction involved proceeds of a specified unlawful activity ("SUA"). SUAs are outlined in 18
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (1995) and include such offenses as fraud, espionage, embezzlement of funds, illegal
arms sales, smuggling, bribery, environmental crimes, obstruction ofjustice, and an exhaustive list of other
offenses associated with organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and financial misconduct. SUA's also
include all of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") predicate offenses listed
in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994), with the exception of Title 31 violations (transaction reporting
requirements).
99 In the view of many, including banking interests and their allies, the language "or another
violation of the law" defines illegal proceeds too broadly by including a host of non-criminal or
administrative violations. Memorandum from Andrew Levchuk, Resident Legal Advisor, United States
Department of Justice, Criminal Division, to Abelardo A. Arias, Law Enforcement Section, United States
Department of Justice, Criminal Division 1 (Nov. 13, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Levchuk].
For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 178-182.
10o Section 1957 replaces the specific intent requirements of Section 1956 with the requirement that
the transaction involve $10,000 and a financial institution. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1995). Section 1957's
knowledge provision requires that the individual know that the funds involved are derived from some kind
of criminal activity but does not require that the funds be used for any additional criminal purpose. DOJ
MANUAL, supra note 85, at R81.
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property, including rights to property acquired through clearly illegal
means."' 0 ' With the pervasiveness of crime and corruption in the Russian
Federation, such a provision may apply to a majority of Russia's financial
community and could thus be too broad.
b. Article 4: Recording requirements
Similar to the requirement of filing financial transaction reports under
the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act, 102 the Money Laundering Draft requires
financial organizations to "make a record of transactions ... for every single
transaction with monetary resources or other property equal to or exceeding.
. . 2000 minimum wages10 3 for any cash or non-cash transaction by a
physical person, and 20,000 minimum wages for any transaction by a legal
entity. ' 1°4 Records of domestic transactions are presented to the State Tax
Inspectorate upon request, while transactions involving foreign currency are
presented to the Russian Federal Service for Currency and Export Control
upon request.0 5  Article 4 gives authority to judges, prosecutors,
investigative agencies, agencies conducting inquiries, and offices of the
Federal Tax Police to request records of transactions that are subject to
mandatory verification "in accordance with the procedure determined by
federal legislation.'
10 6
c. Article 6: Reporting requirements
Under Article 6 of the Money Laundering Draft, transactions
involving monetary resources and other property that meet the monetary
thresholds for the recording requirements would be subject to mandatory
101 Money Laundering Draft, supra note 91, art. 3(2).
102 As promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury, the BSA requires financial institutions to
maintain specific records for possible use by the government in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations
and to file a Currency Transaction Report ("CTR") for domestic transactions or a Report of International
Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments ("CMIR") for foreign transactions in currency or
monetary instruments of $10,000 or more. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22(a)(1), 103.23. The CTR and CMIR are
also known as IRS Form 4789 and Customs Form 4790, respectively. Id.
103 As of January 1999, one minimum wage was equivalent to 87 rubles per month, and 23 rubles
were roughly equal to one dollar. Boylan, supra note 79.
104 Money Laundering Draft, supra note 91, art. 4(1). "Physical person" means a natural person.
I o Id art. 4(2). The State Tax Inspectorate, in conjunction with the Federal Tax Police, is responsible
for regulating domestic financial activity, while the Federal Service for Currency and Export Control has
jurisdiction over currency entering and leaving the Russian Federation. Id. art. 4(3). For the purposes of
this Comment, these agencies will be considered analogous to the U.S. Treasury Department and the
Customs Service, respectively.
o6 Id. art. 4(4).
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verification with either the State Tax Inspectorate or Russian Federal Service
for Currency and Export Control if such transactions fall into any of the
following categories: (1) cash transactions performed by physical persons or
legal entities; (2) bank account transactions by physical persons and legal
entities; (3) credit transactions by legal entities and physical persons; (4)
transactions by legal entities and physical persons involving securities; or (5)
transactions with real and personal property.1
07
Article 6 is comprehensive in nature. It covers activities commonly
associated with money laundering such as money structuring; wire transfers
of funds to or from foreign banks, offshore accounts, or to regions known for
the illegal production of drugs; deposits in the name of third parties;
contract, credit, and securities fraud; and transactions made with bank
checks, traveler's checks, foreign currency, precious metals and gems, or
other personal property.
8
Although functionally similar to the BSA's "suspicious activity"
reporting requirements and the Treasury Department's "know your
customer" policy,'0 9 Article 6 would divest a financial organization of much
of its discretion in determining what constitutes suspicious financial activity
that qualifies for mandatory verification with federal authorities. Instead,
this determination would be made in large part based on the language in
Article 6 itself.'10 Through the objective criteria of Article 6, a financial
organization or its employee would be required to determine whether certain
financial activities qualify for mandatory verification according to the
objective criteria laid down in Article 6."' This determination would
involve some degree of subjective judgment on the part of the financial
107 Id. art. 6(l)-(5). The separate categories, with all of the enumerated criteria, are listed in Article 6
of the Money Laundering Draft. Id.
log Id.
'09 According to regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department under the Annunzio-Wylie
Act, a financial institution is required to file a suspicious activity report ("SAR") if the financial institution
"knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect" that the financial transaction (1) involves or is an attempt to
disguise proceeds from illegal activity, (2) is designed to evade the requirements of the BSA, or (3) appears
to have no business or apparent lawful purpose. 31 C.F.R. § 103.21(a)(2). The Annunzio-Wylie Act's
SAR requirements both prohibit the financial institution from notifying the customers on whom they have
filed an SAR and provide a "safe harbor" provision that protects the institution and its employees from
possible civil liability arising out of the SAR activity. Annunzio-Wylie Act, §§ 5318(g)(2), (3). The
Annunzio-Wylie Act also encourages financial institutions to establish "know-your-customer" programs
that facilitate a financial institution's ability to recognize suspicious transaction activities. Id. § 5318(a)(2).
110 Money Laundering Draft, supra note 91, art. 6.
1 As an example, a provision of Article 6 mandates the verification of cash transactions performed
by physical persons or legal entities when the cash sum is deposited into or withdrawn from a bank account
and cannot be explained by the nature of the business. Id. art. 6(2).
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institution, however, as it would have to decide whether a transaction
"cannot be explained by the nature of the business."'"12
The mandatory guidelines in Article 6 would clearly benefit federal
policies of fighting money laundering and other financial crimes in Russia
by removing discretion and consequently promoting compliance within the
poorly regulated and unstable Russian financial sector. Such a regulatory
scheme could also be of use in the United States, where a common criticism
of the mandatory reporting requirements of Currency Transaction Reports
("CTR") for domestic transactions and Reports of International
Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments ("CMIR") for foreign
transactions is that the requirements are too onerous and that the flood of
information that is produced by CTRs and CMIRs obstructs the ability of
government to analyze suspicious activity data." 3
d. Article 7: Protection of banking and commercial information
Under the "safe harbor" provisions of the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-
Money Laundering Act ("Annunzio-Wylie Act"), which serves to target
financial institutions involved in money laundering activities, a financial
organization (or its employee) complying with BSA reporting requirements
is shielded from civil liability. 14  Similarly, Article 7 of the Money
Laundering Draft would provide safeguards for the financial organization (or
employees) required to report suspicious transactions. Article 7 states that
the dissemination of financial transaction information to lawfully authorized
bodies "does not constitute a violation of commercial or official
confidentiality."' 1 5 It further notes that financial organizations "shall not be
held liable for damages or harm suffered by legal entities or physical persons
as a result of lawful fulfillment of their duty to report" suspicious financial
transactions.1 6 Moreover, in response to corruption in law enforcement and
regulatory agencies, Article 7 would require that government bodies and
other agencies authorized to receive such financial information "shall be
held liable under federal legislation for unlawful disclosure of information
received in the course of their official duties that constitute commercial,
banking, or official secret[s]. ' 17 This provision would guard against the
112 Id.
1"3 Noble & Golumbic, supra note 69, at 132 n.247.
:4 Annunzio-Wylie Act §5318(g)(3).
I5 Money Laundering Draft, supra note 91, art. 7(1).
116 Id. art. 7(5).
117 Id. art. 7(4).
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abuse of authority by government bodies that may leak such financial
information to organized crime groups for purposes of extortion." 
8
2. Draft Amendments to the CCRF
In 1996, members of the Security Committee 19 of the Duma and a
member of the Committee on Industry, Construction, Transportation and
Energetics 120 introduced Article 156 as a proposed amendment to the CCRF.
Article 156 would allow penalties to be assessed against financial
organizations that fail to comply with recording and reporting
requirements. 12  Unlawful refusal by an official performing managerial
functions in a financial organization to provide financial information to
authorized bodies would amount to a penalty ranging from twenty to fifty
minimum wages. 22 The violation of established accounting rules designed
to ensure that information on transactions involving monetary resources and
other property is complete and correct would result in the same fine.
123
Article 156 would guard against the destruction or falsification of
financial records by criminals associated with financial organizations.
Under Article 6, violations of rules and procedures for storing financial
documents, as well as the negligent loss of such documents, would be
penalized. 124  In addition, Article 156 contains a provision on violations of
cash-registering rules (i.e., the accumulation of cash in cash registers beyond
established limits). 125
The penalties prescribed by the proposed Article 156, in conjunction
with the CCRF's provision on abuse of authority (Article 201), 126 would
help prevent the use of financial institutions as fronts for organized crime
money laundering activities. Article 201 provides penalties for the use of
authority by a person discharging managerial functions in a profit-making
organization or any other organization to further unlawful interests against
the lawful interests of the organization "for the purpose of deriving benefits
and advantages for himself or for other persons or for the purpose of
IS HANDELMAN, supra note 2, at 59-72.
119 S. Boskholov, V. Vorotmikov, V. Ilyukhin, G. Raikov, and V. Rozhkov were the named members.
CCRF Draft, supra note 90, at 1.
120 Y. Ten was the named member. Id.
121 Id. at 2-3.
22 Id. at 2.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 2-3.
126 CCRF, supra note 75, art. 201.
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inflicting harm on other persons.' 27  The penalties are significantly
increased if the misdeed results in "grave consequences. '  Such a
provision would benefit prosecutorial efforts to dismantle financial
organizations that act as havens for organized crime.
3. The Draft Law on Verification of Expenditures
The Draft Law on Verification of Expenditures ("Verification Draft")
was incorporated into the Russian Parliament's session calendar in 1997.129
The bill passed three readings in the Duma, only to be rejected by the
Federation Council in December 1997.130 The bill contains provisions that
would enable the Russian government to detect suspicious "placement"
activities that are undertaken by converting currency into real and personal
property. 131 The Verification Draft would require purchases of items in
several categories meeting a 1000 minimum wages threshold to be reported
to the tax authorities in a special declaration that lists the income sources and
amounts used to acquire the property.' 32 The categories of property would
include (1) real estate; (2) aircraft, ocean-going vessels, vessels for use in
internal waters, and ground transportation resources; (3) stock, shares in
base capital ownership of businesses, and investment capital in business
partnerships, state and municipal securities, and savings certificates; (4)
cultural valuables; and (5) gold ingots.133 In addition, a special declaration
would be required for acquisitions1 34 of the listed items in the amount of
more than 3,000 minimum wages. 135
The penalty for failing to provide a special declaration within sixty
days from the date of receipt of a written demand from tax authorities would
be a 100 minimum wages fine.' 36 For a delinquency exceeding ninety days,
the penalty would increase to 1,000 minimum wages.' 37
The Verification Draft expands upon the mandatory reporting
requirements for transactions in real and personal property contained in
127 Id.
128 id.
129 Verification Draft, supra note 92.
130 id.
131 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.132 Verification Draft, supra note 92, art.4.
133 Id. art. 3(1).
134 "Acquisition" is defined as a purchase, barter, new construction, or reconstruction of real estate.
Id. art 2.
' Id. art. 3(2).
236 Id. art. 8(1).
137 Id.
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Article 6 of the Money Laundering Draft. 3 8 The United States covers such
transactions through the Treasury Department's broad definition of a
"financial transaction," which includes such transactions in movable
property as the purchase of precious stones, metals, and automobiles. 139 The
monetary discrepancy between the 2,000 minimum wages threshold of
Article 6 for personal transactions and the 1,000 minimum wages threshold
of the Verification Draft may require reconciliation in order to prevent
disparate application. The Verification Draft, in conjunction with Article 6
of the Money Laundering Draft, would be a useful law enforcement tool
because it would cover the myriad financial transactions a money launderer
often undertakes to hide evidence of crime.
4. Towards a Uniform Anti-Money Laundering Bill
The preceding discussion illustrates that momentum towards a
comprehensive anti-money laundering system like the one that has been
enacted in the United States is building in Russia. Collectively, the
proposed laws contain two important elements of an anti-money laundering
regime: reporting and recording requirements to track suspicious financial
activity at the "placement" stage and significant penalties to deter the
evasion of financial laws. 140 In addition to the proposed laws, the Russian
Federation should promulgate asset forfeiture provisions. Such a law
enforcement tool would not only provide a powerful disincentive for
activities such as money laundering 141 but would also alleviate the deficient
resources of Russian law enforcement by generating revenues from forfeited
property.
142
To promote uniformity in the application of its anti-money laundering
system, the Russian Federation should enact a collective anti-money
laundering law that incorporates the aforementioned proposed articles as
well as asset forfeiture provisions. The passage of such a comprehensive
law would provide the Russian Federation with elementary anti-money
laundering provisions similar to those found in the United States. 143 and
would constitute a first significant step towards confronting Russia's
difficulties with money laundering, capital flight, and financial collapse.'
44
138 See supra notes 107-113. See also Money Laundering Draft, supra note 91, art. 6.
139 See supra note 85.
140 See supra notes 64-72.
141 See infra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
142 See infra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
1" See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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IV. INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF
RUSSIA'S ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION
Substantively, Russia's proposed anti-money laundering legislation is
similar in purpose and scope to the anti-money laundering laws found in the
United States. 145 However, assuming the proposed legislation is passed,
there is little reason to believe that Russia will achieve the same positive
results enjoyed by the United States. The success of the U.S. anti-money
laundering laws is based primarily on underlying institutions and patterns of
civic responsibility that do not exist in Russia. Limitations on the
effectiveness of Russia's proposed legislation include the absence of an
independent judiciary and the consequent lack of confidence and respect for
the rule of law, the limited political accountability of Moscow's ruling elite,
deficiencies in Russia's law enforcement system, and an unstable banking
system with questionable ties to organized crime and Russia's present ruling
elite.
A. The Need for an Independent Judiciary
For a society to achieve compliance with the law, it must first develop
respect for law. In Russia, the concept of law established by Lenin and
employed by the Communist Party was that of law as a political
instrument. 146 According to Kathryn Hendley, a scholar of Russia's legal
reforms, "[1]aw became a tool for maintaining social order and consolidating
political power, to be used at the discretion of the Bolsheviks.' ' 147 The
Communist Party thus used the judicial system as a means of promoting its
policies and achieving its political objectives. 148 Under this system, the
Party influenced a judge's behavior through its control of judicial selection,
tenure, promotion, and salaries. 49 The inadequate funding provided by the
government to judges and courthouses was a reflection of the Party's, and of
society's, disrespect for the judiciary.150
:45 See supra Part III.46 KATHRYN HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER: LEGAL REFORM AND LABOR LAW IN THE
SOVIET UNION 18-19 (1996).
141 Id. at 19.
141 Id. at 123-24.
' Id. at 124-26.
SO Id. at 125-26. "In contrast to the gleaming marble edifices that housed Party officials, Soviet trial
courts were housed in old wooden buildings that were dingy, dark, poorly heated and maintained, and
difficult to find." Id. at 125.
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A necessary predicate to social compliance with and government
enforcement of laws like Russia's proposed anti-money laundering law is an
independent judicial system.' 51 For compliance to occur, Russian society
must learn to trust and respect its courts. Such trust will not come about if
the judicial system continues to be a tool of the ruling elite. As Hendley
concludes, "[tihe core element of the rule of law is that law applies in equal
measure to the powerful and the non-powerful and that legal institutions
have sufficient authority and independence to make meaningful the remedies
imposed against the powerful."'
152
Although Russia has moved away from the Leninist model of the
judicial system since the collapse of the Soviet Union, "[m]uch of the former
structure that enabled the Soviet government to control [a] judge's decisions
still exists, and Russians remain very suspicious of the judiciary."'5 3
Significant steps are thus needed in order to reform the judicial system.
These include extending the tenure of judicial appointments, 154 providing
adequate funds for judges and the court system, establishing mechanisms to
ensure that the provision of such funds is not tied to political power, 55 and
instilling the concept of impartiality and social activism in the Russian
judiciary. 156 In short, without the assurance that Russian judges will oversee
money laundering prosecutions with impartiality and independence from
political and criminal organizations, the passage of an anti-money
laundering system will do little to confront Russia's crime epidemic.
B. The Limited Political Accountability of Russia's Ruling Elite
In addition to an independent judiciary, a law-based society needs
political accountability from ruling elites.' 57  In Russia, the system of
government passed down from the Soviet era was based on the
nomenklatura system, under which officials of the Communist Party were
immune from legal accountability. 58 According to Anatoly Sobchak, a
former Russian law professor who became a prominent Soviet official
... Id. at 14.
152 Id.
153 Boylan, supra note 87, at 1328.
'5 Id. at 1332-34.
... Id. at 1334-36.
156 HENDLEY, supra note 146, at 122-23.
'57 Id. at 37-38.
's Id. at 37.
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during the Gorbachev years, "[t]he nomenklatura parasitized our society. Its
strength lay in a collective freedom from accountability."' ' 59
Russian Procurator Yuri Skuratov's investigation into Kremlin
corruption offers an example of the difficulties of attempting to hold high
government officials accountable for illicit conduct. 60  Some Russian
commentators argue that the Kremlin's response to Skuratov's investigation
was an attempt to prevent the exposure of high-level corruption. 161 Others,
including Berezovsky, a target of the investigation, maintain that Skuratov's
investigation was frivolous and that it was orchestrated by the Communist
Party-dominated Federation Council to punish Berezovsky's for his openly
anti-Communist views. 162  Either possibility is unpalatable. Either the
Russian prosecutor was used as a political instrument of high-level officials
or severe barriers stand in the way of the Russian prosecutor's attempts to
make high-level officials accountable for illicit activity.
The Russian govemment's limited accountability is reinforced by its
established laws. Under Russia's current constitution, legislators in the
Federation Council and State Duma enjoy broad parliamentary immunity
while in office. 163 "The practical result of Russia's parliamentary immunity
regime is that unless they have been caught red-handed, [have] engaged in
public libel or slander, or [have] placed the safety of another in danger,
Russian legislators stand above the law." 164  This expansive privilege
explains why members of Russia's wealthy oligarchy like Berezovsky take
pains to curry favor and build close connections with politicians in Moscow
or wish to become politicians themselves. 165
Limited political accountability and Russia's parliamentary immunity
laws provide government officials in Russia with an incentive not to comply
with the law.' 66 These factors will make both the passage and enforcement
of the proposed anti-money laundering legislation difficult. The proposed
legislation is unlikely to be successful unless Russia takes steps to hold its
ruling elite accountable for unlawful activities. Reforming or eliminating
parliamentary immunity 67 and informing the Russian public of the illicit
:" Id. (quoting ANATOLY SOBCHAK, FOR A NEW RUSSIA 21 (1992)).
60 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
161 LaFraniere, supra note 5.
62 Paul Quinn-Judge, The Fall of an Oligarch, TIME INT'L, Apr. 19, 1999, at 42.
163 Scott J. Boylan & Catherine L. Neweombe, Parliamentary Immunity: A Comparison Between
Established Democracies and Russia, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 205, 238-41 (1997).
u" Id. at 244.165 Id. at 240-41. "Russia's parliamentary privilege laws attract those trying to hide from the law to
the Russian Parliament and worse, promote crime and corruption at the highest level of public service." Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 249-50.
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activities of government officials are two actions that could help create such
accountability.' 
68
C. Deficiencies in the Russian Law Enforcement System
Russia's post-Soviet law enforcement apparatus possesses neither the
resources nor the expertise to handle its crime epidemic.' 69 Because of the
Communist Party's monopoly on crime in Soviet Russia, the Soviet
government did not officially recognize the existence of organized crime.
170
Consequently, few law enforcement officers of the post-Soviet era
completely grasp the intricacies of white collar and organized crime, let
alone possess the training to prosecute such crimes.171 Moreover, because of
a lack of state resources, Russian Federation police officers are "tragically
underequipped" and poorly compensated, 72 while members of criminal
organizations often have the benefit and expertise associated with the
Soviet-era KGB. 7 3  Thus, even assuming the passage of an anti-money
laundering regime in Russia, law enforcement will find itself at a
disadvantage in seeking to prosecute criminals under the proposed laws.
D. Instability in Russia's Banking System
Money laundering prosecution is greatly handicapped without active
assistance from the financial sector. In the United States, this has been
demonstrated by the effectiveness of the financial activity reporting
.68 Id. at 251-52. Unfortunately, those interested in maintaining the status quo in Russian
government, such as bankers like Berezovsky, control much of Russia's media empire. Juliet Johnson,
Commentary Perspectives on Russia, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1998, at B5.
"9 Andrei Shleifer, World Economic Crisis, Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Banking
Committee (Sept. 15, 1998), available in 1998 WL 18088399 (discussing how the underfinanced and
poorly organized state police's inability to protect business contributed to the rise of organized crime in
Russia).
170 HANDELMAN, supra note 2, at 284. The Soviet justice system defined criminal behavior as any
conduct that was considered "socially dangerous," a phrase that "in Soviet-speak generally meant anything
construed as a challenge to state authority." Id. at 275.
"' Id. at 284.
172 Id. at 282-83. Russian Federation police lack adequate firepower and work with outdated arms
and other equipment that cannot match what is readily available on the black market. In 1993, a Russian
militiaman earned 30,000 rubles per month (about $30 U.S.), which was less than what many factory
workers received. Id.
' Id. at 294. After the breakup of the Communist Party, the KGB lost much of its influence and
many of its members took part in the privatization crime wave by joining front organizations, banks, and
commercial enterprises. Former KGB members may also have acted as mercenaries and instructors for
organized crime groups. Id.
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requirements. 74 The United States obtains effective results in prosecuting
money laundering activities largely because of the banking industry's
compliance with requirements for recording and reporting financial
transactions. 175 By working with financial institutions in the investigation of
money laundering activities, the United States has created a direct channel
to crucial information at the financial source for investigators and has
transferred a large administrative burden to private entities. 71
In Russia, the instability of the banking industry provides a
significant barrier to effective money laundering investigation. This
instability is due to insufficient regulation of the banking industry and the
industry's intimate connections with organized crime and members of
Russia's corrupt oligarchy. 177  Indeed, one of the greatest obstacles to
enactment of the proposed legislation is the banking lobby. 78 Mixed into
the ranks of this lobby are the post-Soviet politicians and bureaucrats who
fear that enactment of the proposed legislation would allow investigators
to uncover funds that they diverted during the Russian privatization
process. 179
Banking interests and their allies have challenged the proposed
legislation by arguing that the statutory term "illegal proceeds" should be
amended to read "criminal proceeds."' 80 Such a change in the law would
limit its reach "to the likes of drug dealers and traditional organized crime
elements whose ill-gotten gains are the proceeds of easily identifiable
crimes such as narcotics trafficking, extortion, prostitution, and loan
sharking."1 8' Even the term "illegal proceeds" would not include the
misuse and conversion of illegal proceeds and other white-collar fraud
schemes that have contributed to the collapse of the Russian banking
system.182  Russia's recalcitrant banking sector, with its intimate
174 See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See supra notes 21-49 and accompanying text. Skuratov's investigation into government
corruption also led to charges that Central Bank officials laundered money out of government coffers
through a shell corporation set up in the Channel Islands, a locale internationally known as a money
laundering haven. Igor Semenko & Jeanne Whalen, What is FIMACO?, Moscow TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 6806156.
,T7 Levchuk, supra note 99. See also Duma Veers Far to Government's Left, supra note 73
(discussing Central Bank chief Viktor Gerashchenko's opposition to proposed measures dealing with
money laundering activities).
179 Boylan, supra note 79.
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connections to money laundering activities, stands as a challenge not only
to the enforcement, but also to the enactment, of the proposed legislation.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE RUSSIAN ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
REGIME
A. Forfeiture Provisions
As a supplement to penalties under its money laundering legislation,
the Russian Federation must promulgate effective asset forfeiture
provisions. Such a law enforcement tool would not only provide a
powerful disincentive for criminal activities such as money laundering, but
would also alleviate the problem of inadequate resources in Russian law
enforcement. 183 Properly seized assets could be used to fund law
enforcement activities, 184 leveling the playing field between criminal and
police officer. 1
85
Although the CCRF contains an asset forfeiture provision, 186 this
provision suffers from problems similar to those of Article 174."' While
it is a part of the Russian Federation's new criminal laws, the CCRF asset
forfeiture provision lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms, and the U.S.
State Department has noted that the implementation of the provision has
been weak. 18
8
B. The Need for a List of Specified Unlawful Activities
Because vaguely drafted provisions may lead to both constitutional
difficulties and an abuse of discretion by law enforcement and judicial
183 See supra notes 169-173.
.. If the Russian Federation channeled criminal forfeitures directly into law enforcement projects, it
would be following the example of seven members of the Financial Action Task Force ("FATF"):
Australia, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. FIN. ACTION
TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 61, at 10. Other countries that do not have such a fund
hold that such placement of income is contrary to the principle that all monies raised by government are put
into a general revenue fund and all disbursements are then made from this fund. Id. The FATF was
established by the 1989 G-7 Summit in Paris to examine measures to combat money laundering. Members
of the FATF include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Id. at 5.
s5 See supra notes 169-173.
:86 CCRF, supra note 75, art. 52.
87 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
88 U.S. Report Paints Bleak Picture of Laundering in Russia, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, May
1993, at 8.
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authorities, the Russian Federation should list the requisite unlawful
activities in its money laundering laws. The broad definition of a financial
organization 189  and the expansive list of suspicious financial
transactions1 9 in the Money Laundering Draft are examples of the
specificity that is necessary in a civil law system. 191 Activities specified as
unlawful in Russia's money laundering laws should include not only those
crimes that are commonly associated with organized crime, such as drug
trafficking and extortion, but also white-collar criminal activities such as
fraud, tax evasion, and other forms of financial mischief that are more
closely related to the collapse of Russia's financial system.
C. Crackdown on Illegitimate Banks
Because of the significant role that detection of the act of "placement"
plays in the prosecution of money laundering offenses, 192 the Russian
Federation must promulgate stricter banking regulations that will both weed
out illegitimate financial organizations and require that financial
organizations play an active role in detecting unlawful activities. If
organized crime is permitted to maintain a connection to Russia's financial
sector, there is little reason to believe that banking institutions will not
continue to channel illicit revenues out of the country.'193 Reining in control
of its financial industry would be a first significant step in confronting
Russia's capital flight and economic instability. The Russian Federation
should enact provisions like the bank "death penalty" in U.S. anti-money
laundering statutes, which provides the government with the authority to
terminate the operations of suspect or delinquent financial organizations. 194
189 See supra note 95.
190 See Money Laundering Draft, supra note 91, art. 6.
191 See WATSON, supra note 88.
192 See supra notes 66-69.
193 See Boylan, supra note 79. The money laundering scandal involving the Bank of New York is a
prime example of Russia's continuing money laundering problem. In late 1999, the U.S. Justice
Department initiated an investigation into allegations that the Bank of New York was being used by
Russian businesses and individuals to funnel illegal proceeds out of Russia. John Tagliabue, Inquiry Shows
Russians Laundered Monet [sic] Through U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1999. These Russian groups are
suspected of funneling as much as $10 billion through the bank, which is the fifteenth largest financial
institution in the United States. Marcy Gordon, Launderers Find New Ways to Make Dirty Money Look
Clean, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21538981.
194 In 1992, Congress through the Annunzio-Wylie Act created a "death penalty" for banks and other
financial institutions that engage in violations of the MLCA or criminal violations of the BSA. Under the
death penalty provision, if a financial institution is convicted for violations of the MLCA, the government
is required to initiate termination proceedings against the offending institution. The government also has
the option of instituting such proceedings for criminal violations of the BSA. Annunzio-Wylie Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 93(c); 131; 1464(w); 1786(h)(1)(c); 182 1(c)(4)(M). Factors to be taken into account include:
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D. The Need for an International Response: Conditional Aid to the
Russian Federation
Russia's problems with crime, corruption, and economic instability
have created a vicious cycle. Capital flight in Russia results in financial
crisis. 195  Russia's inability to generate sufficient tax revenues 96 makes it
difficult for the government to fund health, education, culture, infrastructure,
and law enforcement services.1 97  The lack of adequate funding for law
enforcement agencies allows criminal activities, especially the activities of
powerful figures in Russia's parliament or of individuals associated with the
Mafiya, to go unchecked. 98  In turn, Russia's powerful figures thwart tax
and criminal laws by channeling capital out of the country. 199 This occurs
because Russia does not have a working anti-money laundering system.200
Clearly, it is in Russia's economic and political interest to break this cycle
by passing an effective anti-money laundering system in the Duma and the
Federation Council.
Because partisan politics, government corruption, and the influence of
organized crime could effectively delay the enactment of needed legal
reform measures indefinitely, the United States and global organizations
such as the IMF and the World Bank should require Russia to undertake
economic and legal reforms as a condition of financial relief. Although the
IMF has made conditional aid part of its policy in Russia, 1 its requirements
(1) the extent to which directors or senior executive officers of the institution in question knew of, or were
involved in, the commission of the offenses at issue; (2) the extent to which the offense occurred despite
the existence of policies and procedures designed to prevent the occurrence of any such offense; (3) the
extent to which the institution has fully cooperated with law enforcement authorities in the investigation;
(4) the extent to which the institution has implemented additional controls since the commission of the
offense to prevent the recurrence of violations; and (5) the extent to which the interest of the local
community in having adequate deposit and credit services would be threatened by the forfeiture of the
franchise. Id. 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(c)(2)(A)-(E).
:95 Kravis, supra note 51.
96 In 1998, Russia generated an average of $1 billion per month in tax revenues, an amount less than
the tax revenues generated by New York City. Russia in Default: Money Can 't Buy Me Love, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 6, 1999, at 23 [hereinafter Russia in Default].
197 Kravis, supra note 51.
'9 Shleifer, supra note 169.
199 Russia in Default, supra note 196, at 25.200 See supra notes 34-57 and accompanying text.
201 As part of the disbursement plan of July 1997, the IMF required the Russian Federation to
streamline the tax code and reduce tax rates, reform tax administration procedures and a budget code, have
a more uniform application of the value added tax, and reduce federal subsidies. Summers, supra note 45.
In addition, the IMF urged Russia to make the privatization process more transparent and open, cut
substantially the number of "strategic firms" exempted from privatization, accelerate reform of the banking
and energy sectors, eliminate non-cash payments for utilities and infrastructure, increase capital market
transparency, strengthen measures to enforce minority shareholder rights, and improve bankruptcy
legislation and enforcement. Id.
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should focus more on factors related to capital flight, which is largely
responsible for Russia's financial crisis.
In 1998, the United States sent $611 million in aid to Russia.20 2
However, there is reason to believe that the generous stance of the United
203States is shifting. Without a guarantee that relief funds will be used to
reform basic economic and legal institutions in Russia and will not be
channeled into the pockets of corrupt politicians, the United States, other
nations, and international organizations inclined to provide support should
reconsider their Russian aid programs. Aid should only be provided if it is
conditioned upon economic and legal reform and the implementation of an
anti-money laundering regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
Russia's post-Soviet history offers much to be commended. Over the
past decade, the Russian Federation has made the onerous transition from a
Communist command economy to a market-based democracy. As a
watershed event, post-Soviet Russia presided over the enactment of a new
criminal code, providing a drastic break from its Soviet past. The enactment
of this code marks the new predominance of private or individual rights over
those of the Russian State.
Through the growing pains of Russia's privatization era, however,
many individuals with less than noble intentions abused their prior positions
in the Soviet bureaucracy to pilfer government-owned property. Moreover,
organized crime proliferated in the wake of the country's anemic law
enforcement apparatus. Corrupt politicians, in conjunction with organized
crime, are responsible for the present-day financial crisis in Russia.
Until the Russian Federation has the vision to understand the source
of its ailment, long-term economic progress and legal reform will not be
achieved. As a significant step along that road, the Russian Federation
should enact a comprehensive anti-money laundering system that
incorporates laws similar in purpose and scope to those found in the United
States. To confront political opposition to the passage of anti-money
laundering laws, foreign donors should condition aid on economic and legal
202 Western Man's Burden, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1998, at 49. Comparatively, aid from other groups
and nations included (in millions of dollars): the European Union (188), the Soros Foundation (183),
Britain (50.8), Germany (30), Finland (13.6), and Norway (8). Id.
203 Id. See also Clifford G. Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, Russia's Virtual Economy, FOR. AFF., Sept.-
Oct. 1998, at 53 (arguing that bailout programs have not stimulated economic and legal reform in Russia
but rather have fostered an unhealthy dependence on artificial support structures).
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reforms. Such reforms should include the enactment of money laundering
enforcement legislation, an accounting of the Russian Federation's
expenditure of aid received, tighter controls over the banking industry, and
more exacting requirements for bank formation.
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Appendix A-Draft Law on Money Laundering Prosecution, Article 6204
Cash transactions performed by physical persons or legal entities involving:
a. deposit or withdrawal of cash to/from a bank account of a legal entity, when such deposit or
withdrawal cannot be explained by the nature of the business;
b. purchase and/or sale of foreign currency in cash;
c. purchase of securities by physical persons in cash;
d. receipt of monetary resources upon a check to a bearer from a non-resident, or upon a check that
identifies itself as winnings;
e. exchange of bank notes of one value to bank notes of another value; or
f. deposit of cash, packed and sealed by another bank, to the bank account.
2. Bank account transactions by physical persons and legal entities involving:
a. multiple deposits of monetary resources to the bank account by a physical person or legal entity
within the same banking day through different banks (branches);
b. accumulation of monetary resources into a bank account with processing of documents specifying
such account as accessible to a bearer;
c. deposit of monetary resources into a bank account that has been involved in no transactions or
insignificant transactions in the past, accompanied by the request to make payment in cash;
d. opening an account using cash, with third persons as beneficiaries;
e. opening an account using paid bank checks and traveler's checks;
f. transfer of monetary resources to a bank account abroad that belongs to an anonymous owner;
g. big transactions by a newly-formed legal entity, or legal entity whose past account activity was
insignificant;
h. transfer of foreign currency to an account of a legal entity based on international trade contracts as
a credit for carrying out obligations that are not being carried out by such legal entity;
i. receipt of monetary resources from a legal entity or a physical person, located (residing) and/or
having an account in a bank registered in off-shore areas or free economic zones, as well as in
regions known for illegal production of drugs; or
j. transfer of monetary resources to a legal entity or physical person located (residing) and/or having
an account in q bank registered in off-shore areas, as well as regions known for illegal production
of drugs.
3. Credit transactions by legal entities and physical persons involving:
a. request for a credit secured by a deposit certificate;
b. granting or receiving credit secured with a document that identifies the borrower as having a
deposit in a foreign bank; or
c. granting or receiving credit with an interest rate much higher or much lower then an average
interest rate on the domestic market.
4. Transactions by legal entities and physical persons of securities involving:
a. offer of a large commission for mediation in a transaction with securities;
b. simultaneous purchase and sale of securities at prices significantly deviating from current market
prices on similar transactions, as well as other transactions involving manipulating prices on
securities market; or
c. multiple transactions with the same financial instrument being sold and then purchased back by the
same party.
S. Transactions in movable property or real estate involving:
a. characteristics of void transactions as defined by federal law;
b. violations of the appropriate procedures for their registration and requirements for notarization or
state registration, as provided by law;
c. storage of securities, precious metals and stones or other valuables in a bank or pawn shop in
circumstances that suggest a lack of congruity between such transactions and transactions normally
expected of the person considering his/her occupation, income, and property ownership status; or
d. storage of property while relinquishing personal ownership when such conduct is not explained by
conditions of storage or characteristics of such property.
204 Money Laundering Draft, supra note 91, art. 6.

